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CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Fleming James, Jr. Boston: Little, Brown 
& Co. 1965. Pp. 672. $12.00. 
Not long ago I saw a letter written by a law teacher at an Eastern 
school. In it the writer explained why he had chosen not to review 
a certain new book: to have done so would have violated his persop.al 
precept against reviewing any book about which he could noL be 
unreservedly critical. This so aggravated me that I determined to 
accept at once the invitation to review in these pages Fleming James' 
text on civil procedure. I knew that my opening sentence would have· 
to be, at the very least, "Fleming James has compiled an admirable 
student text on civil procedure." 
Professor Fleming James of the Yale Law School has prepared 
an admirable treatise for use by students in conjunction with a basic 
civil procedure course. It would not be a bad idea for many law 
teachers and practitioners to take a long look at it, too. 
Procedure, along with the body of rules regulating the ·receipt of 
evidence, is what makes litigation exciting. However, procedure is 
difficult to make comprehensible, let alone exciting, in the law school 
classroom. One reason for this difficulty has been the absence of any 
student text on civil procedure that not only meshes with a civil 
procedure course of proper breadth but also imparts some sense of 
the flux of the field. Now there is such a text and, having been put 
together by Professor J am~s, it is as good as would be anticipated, 
which is to say that it is very nearly unimpeachable. 
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In my view, the organization of James' book is almost perfect. 
Surely a chronological approach to the teaching of civil procedure 
makes sense, and it is this approach, for the most part, that James has 
adopted. First there is some general background, mostly historical. 
It is a pretty compact package: two pages on the distinction between 
"substance" and "procedure" ;1 five pages to describe the adversary 
trial system;2 fourteen pages of Anglo-American legal history;3 a 
general analysis of remedies;4 a brief rundown of the American 
judicial structure;5 a lucid section on the federal diversity jurisdic-
tion6 that is marred only by the fact that Hanna v. Plumer1 came 
along too late for inclusion; and an outline of a litigation's life 
history8 that closes James' initial chapter. 
No one need be perturbed by the brevity of James' far-ranging 
first chapter. It is merely preliminary; additional historical back-
ground is sketched in at appropriate junctures throughout the 
volume.9 This, it seems to me, is as it should be. The opening chapter 
can easily be read by a iaw student in one sitting, and with profit, 
even before his civil procedure class meets for the first time. More 
detailed historical perspective can be picked up when the student 
consults subsequent topics as they are reached in the classroom. 
Following his introductory material, James presents a series of 
chapters dealing in sequence with the bane of the law teacher in 
this field: the paperwork of litigation. In these chapters the student 
confronts the complaint,10 responsive and subsequent pleadings,11 
variance and amendment,12 and disc~,very and other pretrial devices.18 
These sections are preceded by a cogent general description of the 
functions of pleadings and motions.14 Several sections are devoted to 
the pleading of specific claims--torts,15 contracts,16 and damages.17 
1. Pp; 1-3. 
2. Pp. 3-8. 
3. Pp. 8-21. 
4. Pp. 21-31. 
5. Pp. 31-33. 
6. Pp. 33-45. 
7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
8. Pp. 46-53. 
9. Professor James consistently employs in his text the pattern he has long followed 
in the Yale classroom: history, early and later code treatment, then modem procedure 
with emphasis on the federal rules. The principle of full disclosure probably dictates 
that I add here that I had most of my civil procedure from Fleming James and that 
I thought then, as I do now, that his classroom approach was the right one. 
10. Pp. 61-99. 
11. Ch. 4. 
12. Ch. 5. 
13. Ch. 6. 
14. Pp. 54-61. 
15. Pp. 100-14. 
16. Pp.' 114-22. 
17. Pp. 122-25. I wish that James, in discussing "general" and "special" damages, 
had tackled the formulation of a test for distinguishing between the two categories; 
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A few of these sections are a bit thin; in the solitary page assigned to 
the pleading of res ipsa loquitur,18 for example, James lightly tosses 
off the vexing question whether a plaintiff ought invariably to be 
permitted to summon the aid of res ipsa when he has pleaded specific 
acts of negligence. Quoting a source that he justifiably favors--
Harper and James, The Law of Torts-James advocates the abandon-
ment of any pleading rule foreclosing plaintiffs from having more 
than one string in their bows, but he fails to consider the harder 
problem: whether a plaintiff who has pleaded and sought to prove 
specific negligence should be required to elect before going to the 
jury.10 
Moreover, James says not a word about the current and important 
question concerning the extent to which a plaintiff may rely on a 
res ipsa loquitur theory against multiple defendants.20 This issue is 
far too significant in such active areas of litigation as medical mal-
practice, product liability, and construction-industry injuries to be 
kept from the student. 
Professor James is at his most effective in outlining the uses of 
pretrial discovery devices to fill the gaps in knowledge left by notice 
pleading. Aside from an occasional slip (he advises the student, for 
example, that the, oral deposition "is the only means of discovery 
aadressed to the nonparty witness"21) and a tendency, to me jarring, 
to be somewhat flip in describing the legal profession to students 
Games labels a three-phase pleading gambit as "a trilogy known in 
the trade as the last refuge of the deatbeat"22), the author does a 
thoroughly helpful job of explaining the close combat that is pre-
trial discovery and of revealing what techniques have proved es-
pecially useful for particular purposes. 
Next comes a long chapter on the trial itsel£;23 this chapter 
is superb. Without wasting words, James illuminates the com-
plete arsenal of jury-control concepts and devices. He does a much 
better job than has ever been done before in expounding, for stu-
dent consumption, such conundrums as the double-barreled burden 
of proof concept,24 the wavering distinction between "fact" and 
instead, he contents himself with a brief catalog of items held in the past to have 
fallen on one side of the line or the other. 
18. Pp. 111-12. 
19. See, e.g., Erckman v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 61 Ill. App. 2d 137, 210 N.E.2d 42 
(1965). 
20. Compare Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953), with Huggins v. 
John Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E.2d 448 (1964). 
21. P. 184. Compare James' discussion of deposition on written interrogatories a few 
pages later. Pp. 188-89. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(a). 
22. P. 230. (Emphasis added.) 
23. Ch. 7. 
24. Pp. 248-66. 
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"law,"25 and the quantum of evidence sufficient to establish a mate-
rial proposition. 26 
Fleming James holds the civil jury in high regard and makes no 
secret of the fact; he wears it on his sleeve. His is not a blind devo-
tion, however. Professor James proposes a realistic view of the jury's 
contribution to the adjudicative apparatus. It is, of course, unsurpris-
ing that one associated with the Yale Law School, where men first 
began to question the more magical conceptions of our judicial 
mechanism, should suggest a frank reshaping of our thinking about 
juries. We ought, says James, to recognize the good in the fact that 
juries "reflect the community sense of over-all faimess."27 This sug-
gestion does not possess unlimited shock value; James simply is will-
ing to say out loud what trial lawyers have known all along. It is 
the proposal born of this candid awareness that will bother some. 
James argues, with his usual vigor, that trial judges should be free 
to enter judgment on demonstrable compromise verdicts.28 While 
some courts have spoken of the civil jury's "time-honored right ... 
to render a compromise verdict,"29 James' argument is not univer-
sally accepted.30 His .text is certain to be cited in strong support of 
such verdicts, which are so much a fact of life to the litigation special-
ist that the statement is often heard that all American jurisdictions 
follow the comparative negligence rule. 
Having devoted 336 pages to what can be denominated the flow 
of litigation, James in the next 336 deals with the more rarefied 
reaches of civil procedure. It is from this point that his.treatise may 
sometimes edge beyond the bounds of many initial procedure 
courses into areas often relegated in large measure to subsequent, 
"advanced" courses. In these pages James discusses problems that 
crop up somewhat less than frequently-at least in any really com-
plex form-in the practice of even the most active litigators. His 
chapter on the right to jury trial,31 which grew out of a significant 
article published several years ago, 32 is the finest thing that has ever 
been done with the subject. On the other hand, James' chapter on 
parties is no substitute for Professor Reed's landmark article;88 noth-
ing could be. 
25. Pp. 266-71. 
26. Pp. 271-80. 
Zl. P. 321. 
28. Pp. 320-22. 
29. Karcesky v. Latia, 382 Pa. 227,235, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955). 
30. Thinking on the general subject of compromise was recently focussed by the 
important paper published by Professor John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Im• 
posed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964). 
31. Ch. 8. 
32. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963). 
33. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1 &: 2), 55 MICH. L. 
REv. 327, 483 (1957). The historical background of this unwieldy topic can be found in 
Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 
COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1961). 
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The chapter on joinder34 is excellent, the section on counter-
claims85 being especially good. James gives class actions, 86 interven-
tion, 87 and interpleader88 a once-over-lightly treatment, which is 
perhaps about what they deserve in a text aimed at students. 
A chapter on judgments39 emphasizes those mysterious twins, 
res judicata40 and collateral estoppel.41 However, set in at the begin-
ning of this chapter is a gem that deserves special mention. Here, 
in slightly over fifteen pages, is a clear-eyed account of the process 
of appellate review.42 It is so good that all law students should be 
required to read it during their first week in law school; they should 
be asked to reread it before taking part in any moot court program, 
and they assuredly should give it a third reading before undertaking 
to assist in the preparation of the briefs in a genuine controversy. 
Jurisdiction and venue are discussed in the concluding chapter 
of James' text.48 Some may feel that this material should have been 
inserted at an earlier point. I doubt that it makes much difference, 
since students do not read this sort of book in sequence, front to 
back. They look up subjects about which their instructor has suc-
ceeded in confounding them; student hombooks, so long as they 
come equipped with an index, could be written backward. Fur-
thermore, the placing of this chapter is probably propitious even if 
it be assumed that the work will be read in the order of its table of 
contents. These two related subjects-jurisdiction and venue-are 
part of the esoterica of procedure. They are best digested after the 
more mechanical aspects of civil procedure have been considered. 
The chapter is tightly compressed and at times slightly out of focus, 
as when it deals with the reach of process in diversity cases, 44 but on 
the whole it is adequate for the purposes of a text. After all, it is fair 
to suggest that student texts are not intended to, and cannot, supplant 
the law teacher in the classroom. 
As the foregoing outline attests, there is nothing revolutionary 
about the organization of James' work. One could wish for more 
material under some headings and less under others, especially if 
one believes, as do I, that pleadings, motions, discovery, and jury 
control devices are the heart and core of civil procedure. But Pro-
fessor James did not compile his treatise for my edification or for 
that of any other specialist in the field; he wrote it for students,' and 
34. Ch. 10. 
35. Pp. 472-94. 
36. Pp. 494-501. 
37. Pp. 501-05. 
38. Pp. 510-15. 
39. Ch. 11. 
40. Pp. 584-610. 
41. Pp. 575-84. 
42. Pp. 516-32. 
43. Ch. 12. 
44. Pp. 653•55. See Field, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J. 166, 172-73 (1965). 
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its great advantages reside not in its potential for expanding the 
instructor's knowledge but in helping him to broaden the student's. 
James sweeps through the entire subject-matter and, because he does 
not write as though there were a premium on antique prose, makes 
civil procedure the living, absorbing subject that it in fact is. 
He does not conceal the massive research on which his text rests; 
neither does he choke the reader with unnecessarily compendious 
footnotes. His notes rely heavily on secondary sources-primarily 
law review discussions; this may be a wise election, since the intrigued 
law student, on the principle of predigestion, is far more likely to 
go to a law review article than to a string of case reports.4ri James' 
footnotes are helpful, too, for their references to other worthwhile 
texts-Judge Clark,46 Moore,47 Wright,48 et al.-and for their fre-
quent key~ng to the leading casebooks. 
My only broad-gauge criticism of James' approach is one that 
others may not share. It goes to his recurring efforts to become, 
through the medium of his text, a second teacher in every law class 
in the land, there to proselyte on behalf of pet theories. Professor 
James did not originate this maneuver, but he indulges in it to 
a degree that some may find excessive, despite the fact that he is 
scrupulous to distinguish appropriately between current dogma and 
Jamesian opinion. It is here that the volume may depart from its 
purpose: aiding the student in comprehending and pondering an 
area of his chosen field. If memory serves, "Jimmie" James did not 
stand before his classes at Yale and advocate particular positions, but 
he does precisely that in this book. There will be law teachers who, 
not being in full agreement with some of James' arguments, will 
from time to time find it necessary, or at least tempting, to demand 
equal time in their own classrooms. 
A less significant criticism is one which, depending on James' 
publication deadline, may be below the belt. His text, published in 
1965, fails to discuss a number of important cases decided in 1964.40 
One of the major problems in writing about any unfolding field 
is that the process of obsolescence begins on the day the page proofs 
are returned to the printer. It is unfortunate that with James' treatise 
45. On the other hand, Professor Field of the Harvard Law School finds James' use 
of secondary sources "somewhat excessive." Id. at 169 n.22. He does not indicate what, 
in his view, would constitute a proper mixture for law students. 
46. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1947). 
47. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1964). 
48. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS (1963). 
49. E.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (discovery by physical examina• 
tion); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (transfer of venue); Zdanok v. Glidden 
Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964) (collateral estoppel), The omission of the 'Van Dusen 
case permits the student to consider open a question that is now closed: the law to 
be applied by the transferee court after a § 1404(a) venue transfer. See p. 671. 
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the process set in here and there during the year preceding its publi-
cation. 
The truth of the matter is that James' text on civil procedure is 
immune to any really important criticism. It can be recommended 
to the attention of law students; it should be, and it will be. 
Jon R. Waltz, 
Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University 
